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The Conservative Party Leadership Election of 2016:  




This article provides the first systematic examination of the voting motivations of Conservative MPs in the final 
parliamentary ballot of the Conservative Party leadership election of 2016. We identify the voting behaviour of 
each Conservative parliamentarian as part of a unique dataset that we use to test, through the use of multivariate 
analysis, a series of hypotheses based around social background variables (i.e. gender and education); political 
variables (i.e. parliamentary experience, electoral marginality, the electoral threat posed by UKIP, and ministerial 
status); and ideological variables (i.e. attitudes towards same sex marriage and Brexit). Our findings demonstrate 
that ideology did matter in terms of voting. Attitudes towards Brexit were central to the appeals of both May (to 
Remainers) and Leadsom (to Leavers). We also demonstrate that in terms of support for Leadsom, Brexit was 
not the only significant driver as opinion on same sex marriage, year of entry and ministerial status also influenced 
voting behaviour.  
  
Keywords: Conservative Party, leadership elections, parliamentary behaviour, Theresa May, 
Brexit.  
 
There is an extensive academic literature on leadership selection within the Conservative Party. 
This article contributes to that literature by assessing voting motivations of Conservative 
parliamentarians in the second parliamentary ballot of their July 2016 leadership election. With 
165 votes (50.2 percent) Theresa May won the first parliamentary ballot comfortably, with a clear 
lead over Andrea Leadsom (66 votes / 20.1 percent) and Michael Gove (48 votes / 14.6 
percent), resulting in the automatic elimination of the lowest placed candidate, Liam Fox (16 
votes / 4.9 percent) and the withdrawal of Stephen Crabb (34 votes / 10.3 percent). She then 
secured the backing of 199 of her parliamentary colleagues (60.3 percent) in the second ballot, 
which provided her with a parliamentary mandate that was stronger than all of her predecessors 
when acquiring the leadership since the democratisation of leadership selection in 1965 – i.e. 
Edward Heath (1965, 49.3 percent); Margaret Thatcher (1975, 52.9 percent); John Major (1990, 
49.7 percent); William Hague (1997, 56.1 percent); Iain Duncan Smith (2001, 32.5 percent); 
Michael Howard (2003; no ballot held as only one candidate); and David Cameron (2005, 45.4 
percent) (Heppell 2008, p. 186).  
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The second parliamentary ballot eliminated the third placed candidate, Gove (46 votes / 14 
percent), and ensured that May would proceed with the second placed candidate, Leadsom (84 
votes / 25.5 percent) to a one member, one vote ballot of Conservative Party members. The gap 
between her and May was so large it created a conundrum for Leadsom. As the Conservative 
membership was assumed to be predominantly pro-Brexit, then as a pro-Brexit candidate 
Leadsom might be able to win a party membership ballot (Mason, 2016). However, proceeding 
with her candidature in this hope would require a two-month campaign, thereby prolonging the 
period of political instability that had been created by the vote to leave the European Union 
(EU). Even if Leadsom could win the party membership ballot she would be left leading the 
Conservative Party with the backing of only one quarter of her parliamentary colleagues. The 
experience of the Labour Party – in which their leader, Jeremy Corbyn, claimed a leadership 
mandate from the membership (59.5 percent), but only had the support of 36 Labour MPs or 
15.5 percent of the parliamentary Labour Party (PLP)(see Dorey and Denham, 2016) was 
something many Conservatives wanted to avoid. Doubts about her capacity to lead effectively 
with such a low level of parliamentary support were then intensified by the following factors. 
First, allegations emerged about her pre-parliamentary career; second, queries about her tax 
returns; and third, her judgement was questioned after she implied that she would a better Prime 
Minister than May because, unlike May, she was a mother. The cumulative impact of the above 
led to her decision to withdraw her candidature rather than proceed to a membership ballot 
(Bulman, 2016).  
 
That May secured such a high level of support from her parliamentary colleagues is the 
conundrum this paper seeks to explain. There is a long tradition of attempting to explain the how 
and why of party leadership selection and ejection within the Conservative Party. Academic 
explanations of Conservative Party leadership elections fall broadly into two camps. The first 
approach can be described as the anecdotally driven narrative – i.e. the profiling of the 
candidates and their strengths and weaknesses; the appraisal of the campaigning period and the 
positions adopted by the candidates (and mistakes made). This is followed by a descriptive 
account of the ballots, leading to a set of explanations of why the victor was selected and the 
vanquished were rejected (see for example, Alderman, 1996, 1998; Alderman and Carter, 2002; 
Dorey and Denham, 2006; Denham and O’Hara, 2008; Heppell, 2008). Within such accounts 
scholars have consistently argued that candidates for the party leadership were being selected (or 
rejected) on the basis of the following: first, evaluations of their ability to unify the party; second, 
their comparative electability; and third, their perceived competence (Stark, 1996).  
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One drawback of this narrative based approach is that academics can be left making somewhat 
subjective assessments of the supposed unifying and electioneering abilities of candidates, and 
perceptions of their overall political competence (although as Quinn, 2016, has demonstrated, 
credible evidence can be assembled from opinion polling to bolster such judgements). That 
limitation explains the value of the second approach, which has been used to explain the 
outcomes of Conservative Party leadership elections. Here the focus is on developing a more 
systematic way of identifying the variables that may have influenced voting behaviour within 
parliamentary ballots. The work of Cowley and Garry (1998) and Cowley and Bailey 
(2000) established this approach as they analysed voting behaviour within the ballots of 1975 and 
1990, testing a range of social, political and ideological variables, so as to provide a more 
nuanced explanation of the elections of Thatcher and Major respectively. Aspects of that 
approach were embraced in the work of Heppell and Hill (2008 and 2010) as they set about 
establishing what motivated parliamentary support for, first, Hague in the 1997 leadership 
election; and second for Duncan Smith in the 2001 leadership election. Such studies revealed the 
influence of ideological positioning on candidate preference – the economic right for Thatcher in 
1975 (Cowley and Garry, 1998), the Eurosceptics for Major in 1990 (Cowley and Bailey, 2000), 
and for Hague in 1997 (Heppell and Hill, 2008), but that ideological positioning was less 
significant in the selection of Cameron in 2005 (Heppell and Hill, 2010).  
  
Our paper embraces and extends that second systematic and quantitative approach as we aim to 
identify the voting motivations of Conservative MPs in the second parliamentary ballot in 2016. 
It could be that ideological positioning might explain voting for May, Leadsom, or Gove, but if 
so is that ideological support based on attitudes vis-à-vis Brexit, or attitudes towards social, 
sexual and moral matters? And what if ideology does not explain voting preference? Should that 
be the case we decided that we should build into our approach a range of social and political 
variable, replicating the modelling of Cowley and Garry (1998) and Cowley and Bailey (2000) but 
adding in variables which were not relevant for their case studies of the 1990 and 1975 
Conservative Party leadership contests.  
 
We have constructed a dataset on the PCP in relation a range of social variables (gender and 
education); political variables (when they first entered Parliament, their parliamentary experience, 
electoral marginality; position in relation to UKIP, and their career status – i.e. backbencher or 
minister); and ideological variables (their attitudes towards same-sex marriage and Brexit). To 
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achieve these aims, our paper is organised into the following sections. Firstly, we identify and 
explain our hypotheses for the voting behaviour of Conservative parliamentarians in the second 
parliamentary ballot. In our second section we address issues relating to how our data was 
collected and collated. Thirdly, we outline the methods used to test our hypotheses and present 
our results, and confirm whether our hypotheses have been substantiated. In our analysis and 
conclusions section we summarise our key research findings, and compare and contrast our 
findings to prior studies on Conservative Party leadership elections.  
  
1. What may have influenced voting behaviour? Selecting variables and determining 
hypotheses  
  
Rather than rely on qualitative research that implies that May was victorious because the 
selectorate (i.e. the PCP) concluded that she was best equipped to unify the party, to appeal to 
the electorate, and demonstrate governing competence, our paper attempts to provide 
quantitative evidence of why some Conservative parliamentarians did (or did not) endorse May. 
Our starting point is to determine which variables – social, political and ideological - warrant 
consideration and the assumptions we hold that  form the basis of our hypotheses.  
 
Social Background Variables: Gender and Education            
 
Our interest in examining the relationship between voting behaviour and the social background 
reflects the fact that existing research on the social composition of the PCP has traditionally 
emphasised how they have recruited from a narrow social strata. Despite various initiatives to 
address this via reforms to candidate selection, and despite some progress on this front, the 
Conservatives have remained sensitive to the accusation that they appear to be sexist and elitist 
(Hill, 2013).  
  
The social background variables that we consider are gender and educational background. 
Cowley and Bailey’s (2000) study of voting behaviour in the parliamentary ballots of 1975 – 
when Thatcher won the party leadership – included gender as a variable, but subsequent 
quantitative driven accounts excluded it due to a lack of female candidates in the 1990, 1997 and 
2001 contests (Cowley and Garry, 1998; Heppell and Hill, 2008, 2010). However, the presence of 
two female candidates in the final parliamentary ballot in 2016 meant that gender was a relevant 
variable for consideration. It was also the first leadership election to occur since the inception of 
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the feminisation agenda which Cameron had launched in opposition – this led to the 
Conservatives making targeted policy pledges and interventions on issues such as parental leave 
and the gender pay gap, as part of an explicit attempt to target female voters (Childs and Webb, 
2012, pp. 165-81).  
 
The contribution of May to the feminisation agenda was considerable. When May entered 
Parliament in 1997 she was one of only 13 female Conservative parliamentarians, the same 
number that they had after their landslide election victory in 1931. In the long years of 
opposition she developed a ‘substantial reputation’ (Childs and Webb, 2012, p. 59) on issues 
relating to women and equality. The development of the feminisation agenda in opposition – and 
the work on candidate selection and training, and the integration of gender politics into policy 
development, alongside the work of the Conservative Women's Organisation (CWO) and 
Women2Win – was only achieved through May’s ‘successful leadership’ (Childs and Webb, 2012, 
p. 68). The credibility and reputation that May had as mentor and role model to female 
Conservatives entering the PCP in the 2010 and 2015 cohorts could not be matched by 
Leadsom. Therefore, on our first variable of gender we will test the following hypothesis:  
 
[H1] Female Conservative parliamentarians will show a stronger likelihood to vote for May as opposed 
to Leadsom or Gove.  
 
Our second social background variable was education, which was used by both Cowley and 
Garry (1998) and Cowley and Bailey (2000). We use the example of the 1990 profile to explain 
how we construct our hypotheses. In terms of schooling, Cowley and Garry assumed (and 
demonstrated) that the privately educated, which they called their ‘surrogate for class’, would 
tend towards either Michael Heseltine (Shrewsbury) or Douglas Hurd (Eton), and that the non-
privately educated would tend towards state educated Major (Rutlish Grammar). They also 
assumed (and demonstrated) that Oxbridge educated parliamentarians would gravitate towards 
Heseltine (Oxford) or Hurd (Cambridge) whilst the graduates of less prestigious institutions (or 
those who did not attend university) would gravitate towards Major (Cowley and Garry, 1998, 
pp. 475-6; 485-6). However, replicating these assumptions was slightly more problematic when 
applied to the succession contest of 2016 than had been the case in 1990. In terms of schooling 
of the candidates, Gove was privately educated, Leadsom was not. Also although May briefly 
attended private school, the majority of her education was non-fee paying. With regard to 
university, May and Gove went to Oxford, whilst Leadsom attended Warwick. The distinctions 
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here are less clear cut than in 1990 when one candidate (Major) had not attended university at all. 
On the basis of the above we constructed the following hypotheses for educational background:  
 
[H2] Privately educated Conservative parliamentarians will show a reduced likelihood of voting for 
Leadsom.  
 
[H3] Oxbridge educated Conservative parliamentarians will show a reduced likelihood of voting for 
Leadsom.  
 
Political Background Variables: Experience, Marginality, UKIP Vote Share and Ministerial Status 
 
Our interest in examining the relationship between voting behaviour and political variables – 
such as year of entry, marginality and ministerial status – also flows from their use in prior 
research on leadership selection. When considering the 1990 leadership selection, for example 
Cowley and Garry implied that Major (first elected in 1979) would be more appealing to less 
experienced MPs than Hurd (first elected in 1974) and Heseltine (first elected in 1966). 
Conversely they hypothesised that Heseltine and Hurd would attract more support from longer 
serving parliamentarians (Cowley and Garry, 1998, pp. 477-8). Can we replicate these 
assumptions with regard to the three way contest between May, Leadsom, and Gove? May was 
the longest serving of the candidates after being first elected in 1997; Gove entered eight years 
later in 2005, whereas Leadsom was the least experienced after entering Parliament in 2010. On 
the basis of this our experience hypothesis is: 
 
[H4] Longer serving Conservative parliamentarians will show an increased likelihood for voting for 
May. 
 
Alongside determining whether there was evidence of a cohort effect with longer serving 
parliamentarians favouring May as the longest serving candidate, we also chose to consider two 
other political determinants: electoral marginality and ministerial status. These variables were 
used in all of the contests that have been subject to prior quantitative assessment (Cowley and 
Garry, 1998; Cowley and Bailey, 2000; Heppell and Hill, 2008, 2010). When considering this we 
assume that Conservative parliamentarians might or should be influenced by polling data about 
the respective voter appeal of the candidates. For example, in the 1990 Conservative leadership 
election, Cowley and Garry assumed that MPs with marginal seats would gravitate away from the 
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least electorally attractive candidate (Hurd) although this was not subsequently proven (Cowley 
and Garry, 1998, pp. 477, 486). On a similar basis we might hypothesise that MPs in the most 
marginal constituencies would support the candidate viewed most positively by the electorate. 
Polling conducted shortly before the first ballot of MPs found that of the five confirmed 
candidates, May was the clear favourite amongst the public with 50.4 percent naming her as the 
most suitable contender to take over from Cameron. Her nearest rival was Stephen Crabb on 
15.9 percent. Amongst Conservative voters May’s lead was even greater, with backing from 58.9 
percent whilst Gove was second on just 14.7 percent (Survation, 2016). As such we offer the 
following hypothesis on electoral marginality: 
 
[H5] Conservative parliamentarians holding marginal constituencies would be more inclined towards 
voting for May. 
 
In addition to electoral marginality we also wanted to identify whether the vote share of UKIP 
within the constituency of each Conservative parliamentarian might be significant. UKIP enjoyed 
a surge in popular support in the years preceding the 2016 Brexit referendum. For example, they 
secured 27.5 percent of the vote and 4.3 million votes in the 2014 elections to the European 
Parliament. Later the same year the defection of two Conservative parliamentarians to UKIP 
(Douglas Carswell and Mark Reckless) and their subsequent by-election victories put Cameron 
under growing pressure. Moreover, the danger of being outflanked on their right (Lynch and 
Whittaker, 2013) was evident from survey based research prior to the General Election of 2015 
which estimated that one quarter of Conservative Party members were contemplating voting for 
UKIP (Webb and Bale, 2014). This demonstrates the threat UKIP posed to the Conservatives 
and why their vote share in marginal Conservative constituencies is significant (on the rise of 
UKIP see Goodwin and Milazzo, 2015). Therefore, based on the assumption that the 
Conservative Party had clear reasons to be fearful of UKIP we decided to examine the vote 
shares for UKIP within each Conservative held constituency. We assumed that those most 
fearful of the UKIP threat would tend towards one of the leave candidates – Leadsom or Gove, 
and those less concerned with the UKIP threat would tend towards May as the remain candidate. 
As a consequence our hypothesis was as follows: 
 
[H6] Conservative parliamentarians holding seats with the lowest UKIP vote shares would be more 
inclined towards voting for May, and those holding seats with the highest UKIP vote shares would be 
more inclined towards voting for Leadsom or Gove.  
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Our final political variable is the career status of Conservative parliamentarians. Here we utilise 
the distinction bewteen insiders/ministers and outsiders/backbenchers which assumes the level 
and extent of ministerial experience could be an influence upon voting. For example, in 1975 
Heath performed strongly amongst those who had been ministers in his 1970 to 1974 
administration, whereas Thatcher was weaker amongst that group and far stronger amongst 
career backbenchers (Cowley and Bailey, 2000, pp. 610-11). How should we apply this to 2016? 
Both May and Gove were ministerial insiders, although as Home Secretary May held a more high 
profile and more prestigious position than Gove, who served under Cameron as Education 
Secretary (May 2010 – July 2014); Chief Whip (July 2014 – May 2015); and Justice Secretary (May 
2015-). Leadsom was the least experienced candidate by a considerable margin. She had been on 
the frontbench for only two years as a junior Treasury minister (April 2014-May 2015) and a 
Minister of State in the Department of Energy (May 2015-16). Based on the above, our career 
status hypothesis vis-à-vis ministerial experience is: 
 
 [H7] Incumbent ministers and former ministers would be more inclined towards voting for May, and 
backbenchers would be more inclined towards voting for Leadsom.  
 
Ideological Variables: Same Sex Marriage and Brexit  
 
There have been a number of studies that have examined the ideological composition of the 
PCP, and they have tended to view ideological conflict through three divides: economic policy 
and the wet/dry distinction; moral issues and the social liberal/conservative distinction; and the 
European policy divide between Europhiles and Eurosceptics (Garry, 1995; Heppell, 2002, 
2013). These categorisations informed the hypotheses on voting behaviour used by Cowley and 
Garry (1998) and Heppell and Hill (2008 and 2010) in their appraisals of the contests in 1990, 
1997 and 2001 respectively.  
 
However, a process of ideological realignment can be said to have occurred within modern 
British conservatism. The morality divide between liberals and conservatives not only remains 
relevant but came to dominate the opposition era, as social liberalism emerged as central plank 
of Cameronite modernisation (Hayton, 2010). Once in government this ideological feud was 
then exposed during the passage of the Same Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act of 2013 
(Clements, 2014). Running parallel to the increasing importance of the morality divide came the 
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gradual disappearance of the conflict between wets and dries over economic policy. The 
economically moderate wet wing of the PCP tended to be located amongst older Conservatives 
who, over time, either retired or were defeated. Furthermore the incoming cohorts from 1992 
onwards were overwhelmingly dry in their economic outlook. Dry economic liberalism became 
‘firmly embedded’ within the PCP (Hayton, 2010, p. 493) as the level of wet representation 
decreased from 33 percent of the 1992 to 1997 PCP to 13 percent in the 2005 to 2010 PCP (with 
dry representation increasing from 56 to 80 percent in the same period, Heppell, 2002, 2009). 
Wet representation within the PCP was so peripheral in the 2010 to 2015 PCP that it was not 
deemed worthy of ongoing consideration (see Heppell, 2013, p. 353).  
 
That means for our ideological determinants we will not include the economic wet/dry divide, 
but we will retain the morality liberal/conservative divide. As Cameron set about reforming the 
Conservatives in opposition post 2005 the liberalism-conservatism cleavage around morality was 
central to identifying his modernising supporters and traditionalist critics (Hayton, 2010, pp. 492-
3). Gaining acceptance for modernised social liberalism would be a slow and painful process in 
the period between 1992 and 2015. Academic research identified that 30.5 percent of the 1992-
1997 PCP was identifiable with socially liberal thinking (Heppell, 2002, p. 312), which had 
increased to only 31.9 percent of the 2010-2015 PCP (Heppell, 2013, p. 348). Cameron 
increasingly alienated himself from the traditionalist wing of his own party by his positive 
rhetoric vis-à-vis endorsing civil partnerships and adoption rights for same sex couples. His 
championing of equal marriage rights for same sex couples succeeded in pitting secular, 
modernising free market liberals against religious social conservatives (Ashcroft and Oakeshott, 
2015, pp. 404-12). On this touchstone issue, Gove and May voted for and Leadsom abstained. 
On the basis of this our morality hypothesis is as follows:  
 
[H8] Social liberals would be more inclined to vote for May or Gove, and social conservatives will be 
more inclined to vote for Leadsom.  
 
We will of course retain the European divide. But by the time the Conservatives re-entered 
office (May 2010) it was no longer credible to define their European policy divisions around the 
labels of Europhilia and Euroscepticism (Cowley and Stuart, 2010, p. 141). Pro-Europeanism 
within the PCP shrank dramatically in the post-Thatcherite era, from 29.6 percent of the 1992-
1997 PCP (i.e. 98 from 336 members) to just 3.5 percent in the 2005-2010 PCP (i.e. 7 from 198 
members). Running parallel to this was a sharp increase Eurosceptic opinion from 58 percent in 
Page 9 of 22
https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/parlij
































































10 | P a g e  
 
the 1992-1997 PCP (i.e. 192 from 336 members) to 91.4 percent in the 2005-2010 (i.e. 181 from 
198 members) (Heppell, 2002, 2009).  
 
Therefore we will update the categorisations to reflect the debate that characterised the 
referendum: between reformists and remain Conservatives (i.e. soft but pragmatic 
Euroscepticism) and the rejectionist and Brexit Conservatives (i.e. hard Eurosceptics). The soft 
variant encapsulated Cameron’s position of seeking renegotiated terms for continued 
membership – that position had been supported by around half of the 2010-2015 PCP (i.e. 154 
members out of 306), with around one quarter subscribing to the rejectionist mind-set that 
would countenance leaving the EU (Heppell, 2013, p. 347). However, there was scope for the 
rejectionist position to expand further within the PCP due to the dual impact of the Eurozone 
crisis and increasing voter concern about immigration (notably the influx of migrants from 
Bulgaria and Romania) as this  created the space for the rise of UKIP (Gifford, 2014). In an 
attempt to nullify the threat from UKIP, and to placate hard Eurosceptic sentiment on his own 
backbenches, in 2013 Cameron committed a future majority Conservative administration to a 
referendum on continued EU membership following the securing of re-negotiated terms. In 
doing so he had created the route to an unwanted referendum and Brexit (see Lynch, 2015). 
 
The European divide creates the basis for our second ideologically centred hypothesis. Although 
the labels differ we embrace the logic underpinning the use of the European divide in previous 
studies of its impact on voting behaviour in leadership elections. So, for example, Cowley and 
Garry assumed (and confirmed) in their study of the 1990 Conservative Party leadership election 
that a correlation existed between pro-Europeanism and voting for either Heseltine and Hurd, 
and Euroscepticism and voting for Major (Cowley and Garry, 1998, pp, 480, 492). The positions 
of the 2016 candidates – May for remain, and Leadsom and Gove for leave - inform our 
hypothesis on the European ideological variable: 
 
[H9] Reformists and remain Conservatives would be more inclined towards voting for May, and 
rejectionist and Brexit Conservatives would be more inclined towards voting for either Leadsom or Gove. 
 
2. Data Collection and Coding  
   
In this second section of the paper we outline how our data was collected and our methods of 
assessment. We needed to establish who voted for each candidate in order to test our various 
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social, political and ideological hypotheses. In terms of our data collection and collation we 
sought guidance from the work of others who have tested such variables amongst members of 
the PCP  (see for example, Cowley and Garry, 1998; Cowley and Bailey, 2000; Heppell and 
Crines, 2016; Heppell, Crines and Jeffery, 2017). To ensure methodological rigour in terms of 
our ideological categorisation we extend the approaches of Norton, 1990; Heppell, 2002, 2013, 
and Heppell and Hill, 2008, 2009 and 2010 – i.e. positioning via division lists, membership of 
party groups and public comments.  
 
The viability of the research is dependent upon our ability to construct an accurate data set of 
the voting behaviour of Conservative parliamentarians in the second ballot. This is challenging as 
party leadership ballots are anonymous. We relied on public declarations of support for a 
candidate, typically made through personal websites, social media, and articles/interviews in the 
mainstream media. In addition we cross-checked these against the various lists of declared 
supporters compiled by media organisations as the contest unfolded, principally the BBC and 
broadsheet newspapers such as The Times and The Guardian.  
 
This approach carries with it concerns about accuracy. First, it is quite possible for an MP to 
publicly declare for one candidate, and then vote for another in the privacy of the polling booth. 
However, the numbers of declared supporters we identified for each candidate – May 194 out of 
199; Leadsom 71 out of 84; and Gove 29 out of 46 – are lower than the actual number of votes 
cast for each. This suggests that any false declarations have not been a major factor in the 
contest. Second, it was also possible for an MP to declare after the ballot that they voted for a 
different candidate than they actually did. For example, on seeing the size of her lead ambitious 
Conservatives may have chosen to claim they voted for May to ingratiate themselves with the 
likely victor. However, the number of individuals declaring afterwards was very small, and we 
discounted such declarations (similarly on Brexit, only positions declared before the referendum 
result was known have been recorded). Overall, our approach is methodologically robust and we 
have an accurate dataset covering the bulk of the selectorate, with only a small number of 
Conservative parliamentarians classified as undeclared – i.e. we identified 294 out of 329 votes 
cast, so we had 35 missing plus one abstention (Cameron). We have identified the voting 
behaviour of 89.3 percent of the 2016 PCP – this is broadly comparable with Cowley and 
Garry’s (1998, p. 483) data on the 1990 leadership election (90.8 percent). 
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Of the nine variables that we wanted to test, distinguishing Conservative parliamentarians by 
gender requires no explanation. With regard to education (both school and university), 
experience (year of entry), constituency marginality and UKIP vote share, as well as ministerial 
career (or not), we collected this information from, first, the UK Parliament website which 
contains profiles for each parliamentarian (see http://www.parliament.uk/mps-lords-and-
offices/mps/), and, second, from the Dods Parliamentary Companion 2016.  
 
With respect to our coding for education we differentiated via four types of school – home 
educated, state, grammar and private – and for university we differentiated according to the 
following six types – did not attend university; attended a post-1992 university; attended a pre-
1992 university (excluding Russell Group); attended a Russell Group university; attended 
Oxbridge; attended a private university. The insider/outside distinction was coded as follows: 
first, being a minister at the time of the leadership election; second, ex-minister or what could be 
defined as the dispossessed; and finally, the never possessed grouping of career backbenchers, 
which may include long standing figures, but also included all of the new entrants in 2015. Both 
electoral marginality and percentage vote share achieved by UKIP within each Conservative 
constituency were continuous variables. 
 
For our ideologically based hypotheses we coded as follows. With regard to the socially liberal/ 
conservative distinction we used the legislation on same sex marriage as our determinant. Those 
who voted for the legislation (and thus endorsed Cameronite modernisation) were defined as 
socially liberal, those who abstained were defined as agnostic, and those who voted against were 
defined as socially conservative. The division lists utilised were from the votes on the second and 
third readings of the Marriage (Same Sex Couple) Bill on 5 February and 21 May 2013. This 
approach enabled us to position those who had been members of the 2010 to 2015 PCP.  For 
those who entered Parliament after that vote, public declarations on constituency websites, 
parliamentary statements in Hansard, and social media activity have been used to determine their 
attitude towards the same determinate variable vis-à-vis same sex marriage. For our European 
policy divide we identified those who voted remain or leave in the EU referendum via the same 
methods as we used for determining who voted for who in the leadership election: i.e. public 
declarations made through social media (Twitter, Facebook, constituency webpages). These were 
cross referenced with media articles and interviews, alongside declared lists of remain or leave 
supporters provided by the print media, and statements made in Parliament on their intentions. 
On the basis of these methods we were able to identify the voting behaviour and thereby 
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ideological position of the vast majority of the PCP. Those that we could not identify were 




3. Research Findings 
 
Table One reports at the basic level of descriptive statistics the pattern of voting with regard to 
all of candidates and all categorical variables that we were considering. Table Two shows the 
output for three logistic regression models, showing the relationship between the odds of 
supporting each candidate and the independent variables outlined above when holding all other 
variables constant. Both tables relate to the 294 Conservative parliamentarians whose voting 
position we were able to determine, and exclude the small number of undeclared or abstaining.  
 
Table One: 
Voting in the Second Parliamentary Ballot of the Leadership Election of 2016:  
Categorical Social, Political and Ideological Determinants 
                                      
  
Variable May Leadsom Gove Total 
     
Vote Share 194 (66.0%) 71 (24.2%) 29 (9.9%) 294 (100%) 
     
Social     
     
Gender     
     
Male 152 (64.7%) 57 (24.3%) 26 (11.0%) 235 (100%) 
Female 42 (71.2%) 14 (23.7%) 3 (5.1%) 59 (100%) 
     
School     
     
Private 81 (65.3%) 30 (24.2%) 13 (10.5%) 124 (100%) 
Grammar 56 (62.9%) 24 (27.0%) 9 (10.1%) 89 (100%) 
State 56 (70.0%) 17 (21.3%) 7 (8.8%) 80 (100%) 
Home 1 (100%) 0 0 1 (100%) 
     
University     
     
Oxbridge 61 (70.9%) 15 (17.4%) 10 (11.6%) 86 (100%) 
Pre-1992 42 (67.7%) 14 (22.6%) 6 (9.7%) 62 (100%) 
Post-1992 8 (50.0%) 6 (37.5%) 2 (12.5%) 16 (100%) 
Private 5 (100%) 0  0 5 (100%) 
Russell Group 63 (67.7%) 23 (24.7%) 7 (7.5%) 93 (100%) 
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[1] For Conservative parliamentarians first elected via by-elections we aligned them to the 
parliament that they had entered – e.g. if elected in a by-election in 1999 they were aligned to the 
1997 parliamentary cohort. For Conservative parliamentarians who have been elected, defeated 
and re-elected we calculate them from their first entry into Parliament. 
  
None 15 (46.9%) 13 (40.6%) 4 (12.5%) 32 (100%) 
     
Political     
     
Year of Entry [1]    
     
Before 1997 21 (63.6%) 9 (27.8%) 3 (9.1%) 33 (100%) 
1997-2010 46 (59.7%) 19 (24.7%) 12 (15.6%) 77 (100%) 
2010-2015 84 (68.3%) 31 (25.2%) 8 (6.5%) 123 (100%) 
2015 43 (70.5%) 12 (19.7%) 6 (9.8%) 61 (100%) 
     
Minister     
     
Current 69 (81.2%) 8 (9.4%) 8 (9.4%) 85 (100%) 
Never 102 (58.6%) 57 (32.8%) 15 (8.6%) 174 (100%) 
Former 23 (65.7%) 6 (17.1%) 6 (17.1%) 35 (100%) 
     
Ideological     
     
Social Position (Gay Marriage) 
     
For 100 (74.6%) 20 (14.9%) 14 (10.5%) 133 (100%) 
Against 57 (54.3%) 41 (39.1%) 7 (6.7%) 105 (100%) 
Abstain 37 (67.3%) 10 (18.2%) 8 (14.6%) 55 (100%) 
     
EU Referendum 
     
Leave 44 (34.7%) 62 (48.8%) 21 (16.5%) 127 (100%) 
Remain 142 (91.0%) 6 (3.9%) 8 (5.1%) 156 (100%) 
Undeclared 8 (72.7%) 3 (27.3%) 0 11 (100%) 
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Table Two: 

























        





        
















       


























     











 2015 1.71 
 
0.22 * 2.77 
      





      
Minister (relative to those who were ministers) 
No 0.46 
 
3.07 * 0.75 





       






 Against 0.74 
 
2.71 * 0.31 * 
       
EU Referendum (relative to those who declared for Leave) 
Remain 18.48 *** 0.05 *** 0.17 *** 
Undeclared 5.55 * 0.33 
 
(empty) 
      
UKIP Vote Share 0.98  1.02  1.00  
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Analysis of Results  
 
Of our social background variables our hypotheses on gender [H1] and education [H2] and [H3] 
are disproven. There is no statistically significant relationship between being a female 
Conservative MP and voting for any of the candidates, nor is there a statistically significant 
relationship between going to a private school or Oxbridge and support (or lack thereof) for any 
candidate.  
 
Our political variables related to parliamentary experience, electoral marginality and backbencher 
or minister. Our assumption that longer serving Conservative parliamentarians would show an 
increased likelihood for voting for May [H4] is not proven, although a relationship that is 
statistically significant is identified in terms of the 2015 cohort, with new entrants less likely to 
endorse Leadsom. This, however, is the only statistically significant relationship with regard to 
parliamentary cohorts. Our assumption that Conservative parliamentarians holding marginal 
constituencies would be more inclined towards voting for May [H5] is not proven – i.e. there is 
no statistically significant relationship between the size of majority and support for May. It is 
particularly illuminating to discover that our assumption regarding the vote share of UKIP [H6] 
is not proven – there is no statistically significant relationship between the threat posed by UKIP 
and voting choice between the remain candidate (May) or the Brexit candidates (Leadsom or 
Gove). This might suggest that Conservative MPs quickly concluded that the referendum result 
would diminish the electoral threat posed by UKIP, or could simply indicate that other factors 
overrode this in their decision making process about who to back for the leadership. In terms of 
ministerial status [H7] we did identity a statistically significant relationship between being a 
backbencher and increased likelihood for voting for Leadsom, suggesting that her position as the 
relative outsider amongst the candidates available had some impact with this group. 
 
Our ideological variables related to attitudes towards moral issues (specifically same sex 
marriage), and Europe. Our assumption that social liberals would be more inclined to vote for 
May or Gove, and social conservatives will be more inclined to vote for Leadsom [H8] is 
partially supported. Although for May there is no statistically significant relationship between 
support for gay marriage and declared support in the leadership election, the hypothesis is 
correct for the other two candidates. Relative to those who supported gay marriage, the odds of 
supporting Leadsom were 2.71 times higher amongst those who voted against gay marriage, 
whilst for Gove the odds were 0.31 times higher.  
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Our assumption with regard to Europe [H9] is supported. Those who backed remain in the EU 
referendum were more likely to vote for May and less likely to vote for Leadsom or Gove. The 
descriptive statistics paint a striking picture, with 91 percent of the MPs identified as remain 
supporters backing Theresa May for the premiership. May also won the backing of 16.5 percent 
of MPs who had voted to leave the EU, lending some credibility to her claim that she could 
unite the party, and perhaps also vindicating her decision to have a prominent Brexiteer, Chris 
Grayling, manage her campaign. In terms of support for May, relative to those MPs who voted 
to leave the EU, those who voted to remain had 18.48 times the odds of supporting May, whilst 
those who were undeclared had 5.55 times the odds of supporting May. Contrastingly, relative to 
those who voted to leave, those who voted to remain had 0.05 times the odds of supporting 
Leadsom, and 0.17 times the odds of supporting Gove.  
 
Overall, the logistic regression models presented in table 2 show that for support for May, the 
only variable of statistical significance is how a Conservative parliamentarian voted in the EU 
referendum. In terms of support for Leadsom, four variables are significant. Firstly, relative to 
those who became Conservative parliamentarians before 1997, those who became an MP after 
2015 had 0.22 times the odds of supporting Leadsom. This suggests the newer cohort of 
Conservative parliamentarians was less receptive to Leadsom’s right-wing, socially conservative 
message than those who had been in the Commons since the Thatcher or Major years. Relative 
to those who were current ministers, backbenchers who had never held ministerial positions had 
3.1 times greater odds of supporting Leadsom, again suggesting that those who shared her 
ideological positioning were not favoured under the Cameron government. This is reinforced by 
the measure of how one voted in the same sex marriage debate. Relative to those who voted in 
favour, those who voted against have 2.7 times greater odds of supporting Leadsom. Finally for 
Leadsom, as with May, how Conservative parliamentarians voted in the EU referendum is very 
important in determining her support. Relative to those who voted leave, those who voted to 
remain had 0.05 times the odds of supporting Leadsom. Hence, we can see that Leadsom’s 
support was higher amongst socially conservative Brexiteers, who tended to have been in 
Parliament for longer, and who had been passed over for ministerial positions. Finally, for 
support for Gove’s candidacy, we can see that his support is drawn from socially liberal 
Brexiteers. Relative to those who voted for same sex marriage, those who voted against had 0.3 
times the odds of backing the former Education Secretary, and relative to those who declared 
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their intention to vote to leave, those who declared in favour of remaining had 0.2 times the 
odds of backing Gove. 
 
Therefore, we can see two major cleavages in this leadership election: positioning in the EU 
referendum and social liberalism/conservatism. May’s support was drawn from those who 
backed remain in the referendum, whilst Leadsom and Gove both drew support from Brexiteers; 





This paper set out to explain how May was able to secure such a convincing victory in the 
second and telling ballot of Conservative MPs by analysing the demographic and attitudinal 
bases of her support. In so doing it draws upon a unique and detailed dataset that facilitates a 
rigorous statistical analysis, allowing us to test assumptions that might underpin media accounts 
or more narrative-based academic inquiries. Our work consequently contributes to and develops 
the systematic approach to analysing leadership elections, as discussed above, by extending the 
investigation of social, political and ideological variables within the PCP. 
 
The result was extraordinary not just for the level of support May secured, which proved 
sufficient to prompt the withdrawal of her remaining rival and the abandonment of the final 
ballot of the full party membership, but because of the widespread expectation that Cameron’s 
successor would come from the Brexit wing of the party. Indeed, all the pro-Brexit runners and 
riders in the contest tried to argue that only a Brexiteer could be trusted to deliver on the 
referendum victory for the leave campaign. May therefore sought to neutralise this threat to her 
chances by proclaiming firmly (and repeatedly) that ‘Brexit means Brexit’.  
 
May was undoubtedly assisted by the self-destruction of the leading pro-Brexit ticket in the race, 
namely the pairing of Boris Johnson and Gove, who had fronted the Leave campaign in the EU 
referendum. Johnson had for a number of years been widely expected to be a contender to 
succeed Cameron, and duly announced his candidature when the contest was triggered. He 
initially secured the backing of Gove who was tipped for a top job in a future Johnson cabinet, 
probably overseeing the Brexit negotiations as Foreign Secretary.  However, with only hours to 
go until the close of nominations Gove turned on his ally in a highly personalised attack and 
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threw his own hat into the ring. This not only prompted Johnson to announce his withdrawal 
from the race but also hugely damaged Gove’s own credibility, with his personal rating amongst 
Conservative Party members falling from +41 before the move to -20 immediately afterwards 
(YouGov, 2016). The drama of the unfolding race perhaps inevitably lends itself towards 
candidate-focused explanations of the result. Indeed, following Gove’s move against Johnson, 
May was regarded by Conservative Party members as by far and away the strongest of the 
remaining five candidates in relation to each of the three Stark criteria. 51 percent saw her as best 
able to win an election (with Gove second on 13 percent); 61 percent saw her as best able to 
unify the party (with Leadsom second on 17 percent); and 63 percent said she would be the 
strongest leader (with Leadsom second on 14 percent) (YouGov, 2016). This view of May as a 
competent, electable and unifying figure no doubt assisted May in the election and contributed to 
her victory, although without survey data of the selectorate (i.e. Conservative MPs) measuring 
their views on each candidate we cannot weight the relative importance of these factors.    
 
What our paper nonetheless demonstrates is that even in the face of the dramatic twists and 
turns of the campaign, attitudes towards Brexit and same sex marriage were the key statistically 
significant factors determining voting. We set out to explain the high level of support for May, 
and it is striking that she won the backing of more than nine out of ten of her fellow colleagues 
in the Remain camp, while the Leave camp was split on the socially liberal-conservative cleavage. 
It is also notable that although larger than many had expected before the referendum campaign 
began, the pro-Brexit faction in the PCP was smaller than the Remain faction, giving May a 
bigger base to work from in the second ballot (following the withdrawal of the only other 
Remain candidate, Stephen Crabb, after the first round). May also secured the backing of 7 out 
of 10 female Conservative MPs, but interestingly this was not a statistically significant factor in 
her victory.  
 
Given the context of the leadership battle, in the aftermath of the EU referendum, the fact that 
the European divide was significant is unsurprising. The contest consequently sits alongside 
1990, 1997 and 2001 as one in which the European issue loomed large as a key factor. If and 
when Brexit is delivered this might be the last Conservative leadership contest about which that 
can be said, marking the end of the defining ideological battleground in the party since the 
Thatcher era. That is not, however, to anticipate the end of ideologically driven voting in 
Conservative leadership battles of the future. The way in which support for the two Brexit 
candidates split along socially liberal-conservative axis is revealing of the depth of division that 
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remains over that issue, and it is possible that an ideological divide on economic issues could re-
emerge in the future, as the country seeks to define the shape of its political economy outside of 
the EU. As such our article has demonstrated that an appreciation of the ideological divisions in 
the PCP is vital for explaining the election of May. The scale of her victory helped create the 
impression of party unity, and it was fortunate for her, and arguably for the Conservatives as a 
whole, that a full-blooded battle with a strong pro-Brexit candidate was avoided. In that sense, 
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